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Abstract
This article proposes a theory of watermarking security based on a cryptanalysis point of view. The
main idea is that information about the secret key leaks from the observations, for instance watermarked
pieces of content, available to the opponent. Tools from information theory (Shannon’s mutual information
and Fisher’s information matrix) can measure this leakage of information. The security level is then
defined as the number of observations the attacker needs to successfully estimate the secret key. This
theory is applied to two common watermarking methods: the substitutive scheme and the spread spectrum
based techniques. Their security levels are calculated against three kinds of attack. The experimental work
illustrates how Blind Source Separation (especially Independent Component Analysis) algorithms help
the opponent exploiting this information leakage to disclose the secret carriers in the spread spectrum
case. Simulations assess the security levels derived in the theoretical part of the article.
Index Terms
Watermarking, Security, Equivocation, Fisher information matrix, Blind source separation.
I. INTRODUCTION
Digital watermarking studies have always been driven by the improvement of robustness. Most of arti-
cles of this field deal with this criterion, presenting more and more impressive experimental assessments.
Some key events in this quest are the use of spread spectrum [1], the invention of resynchronization
schemes [2], [3], the discovery of side information channel [4], [5], and the formulation of the opponent
actions as a game [6].
On the contrary, security received little attention in the watermarking community. The first difficulty
is that security and robustness are neighboring concepts, which are hardly perceived as different. The
intentionality behind the attack is not enough to make a clear cut between these two concepts. An image
compression is clearly an attack related to robustness, but it might happen intentionally, i.e. with the
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purpose of removing the watermark, or not. Robust watermarking is defined in [7] as a communication
channel multiplexed into original content in a non-perceptible way, and whose “capacity degrades as
a smooth function of the degradation of the marked content”. We add that the degradation is due to a
classical content processing (compression, low-pass filtering, noise addition, geometric attack . . . ). The
attacker has three known strategies to defeat watermark robustness: to remove enough watermark signal
energy, to jam the hidden communication channel, or to desynchronize the watermarked content.
T. Kalker then defines watermarking security as “the inability by unauthorized users to access [i.e.
to remove, to read, or to write the hidden message] the communication channel” established by a
robust watermarking. Security deals with intentional attacks whose aims are not only the removal of the
watermark signal, excluding those already encompassed in the robustness category since the watermarking
technique is assumed to be robust.
Some seminal works have already warned the watermarking community that digital watermarking may
not be a secure primitive (i.e., a tool providing information security) despite its robustness. However,
they only deal with dedicated attacks relevant to particular applications. The deadlock attack concerns
copyright protection and illustrates the impossibility to prevent somebody to watermark content with his
own technique and key (by embedding a watermark signal or by creating a fake original) [8]. This ruins
the identification of the owner because two watermarking channels interfere in the same piece of content.
The collusion attack (i.e., the mixing of several watermarked versions of the same content) is related to
the fingerprinting application. Multiple problems in the field of copyright protection and authentication
stems from the copy attack, where the attacker first copies a watermark and then pastes it in a different
piece of content [9]. The oracle attack is a threat whenever the opponent has access to a watermarking
detector as in copy protection for consumer electronics devices [10]. The attacker first estimates the
secret key, testing the detection process on different pieces of content [11]; this disclosure then helps
him forging pirated content. The number of detection tries is here of utmost importance.
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Articles proposing a complete analysis of robust watermarking security are extremely rare. The authors
are only aware of the pioneer work [12], where two digital modulation schemes achieve perfect secrecy,
and more recent works sketching a general framework for security analysis [13], [14]. The main idea
is here to adapt Shannon’s definition of cryptography security to watermarking. At the beginning of the
game, the watermarker selects a watermarking technique and picks up randomly a secret key. According
to the Kerckhoffs’s principle, the opponent knows the selected algorithm but not the secret key. Then,
the watermarker starts producing some marked pieces of content. The opponent has access to some
observations and his aim is to estimate the private key. Shannon’s main idea is that information about
the private key might leak from the observations. Hence, the a posteriori uncertainty of the opponent
decreases as he makes more and more observations. However, the above-mentioned works have only
translated the cryptanalysis methodology into watermarking terminology.
The goal of this article is to offer a complete and workable theory of watermarking security. It
completes Barni’s et al. approach, assessing for the really first time security levels of substitution and,
especially, spread spectrum based watermarking methods. For this purpose, the first section summarizes
the methodology and introduces the basic notation. Measurement of the information leakages are based
on Shannon’s mutual information for a substitutive watermarking method in section III and on Fisher’s
information for a spread spectrum based watermarking method in section IV. This yields estimation of
security levels for three types of attack. Yet, these information theory tools do not reveal any insight for
practical hacking of spread spectrum based watermarking. Section V tackles this algorithmic issue. Tools
from the blind source separation (BSS) field appear to be extremely helpful for the attacker, especially
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and Independent Component Analysis (ICA).
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II. METHODOLOGY
A. Notation
Let us first list some notational conventions used in this paper. Vectors are sets in bold font, matrices
in calligraphic font, and sets in black board font. Data are written in small letters, and random variables
in capital ones. The length of the vectors considered in this paper is Nv: x(i) is the i-th component of
vector x. The probability density function of random variable X (or its probability mass function if X
is discrete) is denoted by pX(.). Hidden messages have Nc bits and secret keys are usually composed of
Nc elements, e.g. several carriers: u` the `-th carrier. Finally, No vectors are considered: xNo represent
this collection of vectors and xj is the vector x associated to the j-th observation.
B. The cryptanalytic approach
The methodology presented in this section is clearly inspired by the cryptanalysis. It has already
been presented in [14], and is based on three key articles: Kerckhoffs [15], Shannon [16] and Diffie-
Hellman [17]. We first briefly present these concepts, before formalizing them in the following subsections.
Kerckhoff’s principle. It has been stated in 1883 that keeping an encryption algorithm secret for years
is not realistic, and this principle is now used in any cryptographic study. In watermarking, the situation
is similar, and it is assumed that the opponent knows the watermarking algorithm. Hence, for a given
design and implementation of an algorithm, the security stems from the secrecy of the key. The designer’s
challenge is: “Am I sure that an opponent will not exploit some weaknesses of the algorithm to disclose
the secret key?”. Watermarking processes are often split into three functions. The first one extracts some
features from content (issued by a classical transform, such as DCT, wavelet, FFT, Fourier Mellin, . . . ),
which are stored in a so-called extracted vector. The second one mixes the extracted vector with the
secret watermark signal, giving a watermarked vector. Then, an insertion function reverses the extraction
process to come back in the original world, putting out the watermarked document. Fig. 1 illustrates the
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Fig. 2. Global point of view of the detection process
embedding process. The detection follows an analogous process as sketched in Fig. 2. According to the
Kerckhoff’s principle, the opponent knows all the involved functions. He thus observes the watermarked
vectors from contents he has access to, because the extraction function has no secret parameter.
Shannon’s approach. The methodology for studying the security of encryption schemes is here trans-
posed to watermarking. The embedder has randomly picked up a secret key, and used it to watermark
several pieces of content. The opponent observes these pieces of watermarked content, all related to the
same secret key but hiding different messages. The watermarking technique is perfectly secure if and
only if no information about the secret key leaks from the observations. If it is not the case, the security
level is defined as the number of observations which are needed to disclose the secret key. The bigger
the information leakage is, the smaller the security level of the watermarking scheme will be.
Diffie-Hellman’s terminology. According to the context of the attack, the opponent may have access
to several kinds of data. The opponent has at least access to watermarked content, but, in some cases, he
might also observe the hidden messages (for instance, the name of the author in copyright protection or
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Fig. 3. An analogy with cryptography: plaintext m→ watermark w, key k→ original x, ciphertext c→ watermarked content
y.
the status of a movie in copy protection) or to the original data (for instance, imagine DVD movies are
watermarked for copy protection; original version of old movies were not protected). This implies that a
security level is assessed for a given context. In this article, we study:
• the Watermarked Only Attack (WOA), in which the opponent only has No watermarked vectors
yNo ;
• the Known Message Attack (KMA), in which the opponent only has No watermarked vectors and
the associate messages (y,m)No ;
• the Known Original Attack (KOA), in which the opponent only has No watermarked vectors and
the corresponding original ones (y,x)No .
The reader might be surprised that the KOA context deserves any attention. Seemingly, there is no need
to attack watermarked content when one has the original version. The pirate does not hack these pieces
of content, but his goal is to gain information about the secret key, in order to, later on, hack different
pieces of content watermarked with the same key.
C. Perfect covering
Although encryption and watermarking are two different security primitives, they might look like the
same at first sight. Fig. 3 illustrates this analogy investigated in this subsection.
Shannon defined perfect secrecy of a crypto-system by the inability of opponents to refine the proba-
bility distribution of plaintexts m by observing related cipher texts, all encrypted by key k. We adapt this
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definition to watermarking, stating that the most important thing to be hidden is the watermark signal,
and not the original content. The equivalent of the plaintext is, here, the watermark signal.
Definition 1: A watermark embedding makes a perfect covering if pW(w) = pW(w|y) for any (y,w).
This means that in a perfect covering scheme, the observations of only watermarked pieces of contents
will never reveal any information on the watermark signal: I(Y;W) = 0. If K→W→ Y is a Markov
chain, I(Y;W) ≥ I(Y;K) holds. Consequently, perfect covering implies perfect secrecy.
Shannon easily found a necessary condition to get perfect secrecy, by using his information theory
tools: H(M) ≤ H(K), where H(.) denotes the entropy, that is, H(M) = −∑m p(m) log p(m). Yet,
the same proof yields the following necessary condition to get perfect covering: H(W) ≤ H(X). This
deeply reveals the difference between cryptography and watermarking. As suggested by the greek word
κρυpiτω (meaning “I hide”), the role of the secret key is, in encryption, to hide the meaning of the
plaintext. Hence, its entropy should be greater or equal to the one of the plaintext. Whereas steganography
(στγανω means “I cover”) hides the watermark covered by the host signal.
D. Information leakages and physical interpretation
If a watermarking scheme does not provide perfect secrecy, then one would like to measure the
information leakage on the secret key. For this purpose, this subsection presents several tools from
information theory, which will later be useful to analyze classical watermarking schemes.
1) Shannon’s measure: In the case where the secret key K is a discrete variable, and more usually a
binary word, the entropy H(K) measures the uncertainty of the opponent on the true value of k. When
he makes some observations1 ONo , his uncertainty is now evaluated through a conditional entropy, which
Shannon named equivocation: H(K|ONo) = H(K)− I(K;ONo). The information leakage is measured
by the mutual information between the observations and the secret key. The bigger the information leakage
1e.g. observations can be “cipher texts”, or “pairs of plain/cipher texts”.
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is, the smaller the uncertainty of the opponent is. Equivocation is a non increasing function with No. It
goes from H(K), ideally down to 0. When it becomes null, this means that the opponent has enough
observations to uniquely determine the secret key. Shannon defined the unicity distance the first value of
No for which the equivocation becomes null, , meaning that the set of all possible keys is now reduced
to only one element. This is a way to measure the security level No? of a primitive.
Unfortunately, these tools are not suitable for any watermarking scheme. It is well known that entropy
(or conditional entropy) of a continuous random variable does not measure a quantity of information.
Mutual information I(K;ONo) is always pertinent as a measure of information leakages; but the physical
interpretation of the equivocation as the remaining uncertainty does not hold when the secret key is
regarded as a continuous random variable as in section IV. For instance, the equivocation can take
positive or non positive values, ruining the concept of unicity distance.
2) Fisher’s measure: This is the reason why another information measurement is proposed. In statistics,
Fisher was one of the first to introduce the measure of the amount of information supplied by the
observations about an unknown parameter to be estimated. Suppose observation O is a random variable
with a probability distribution function depending on a parameter vector θ. The Fisher Information Matrix
(FIM) concerning θ is defined as
FIM(θ) = EψψT with ψ = ∇θ log pO(o;θ), (1)
where E is the mathematical expectation operator and ∇θ is the gradient vector operator defined by
∇θ = (∂/∂θ[1], . . . , ∂/∂θ[Nθ])T . The Crame´r-Rao theorem gives a lower bound of the covariance matrix
of an unbiaised estimator of parameter vector θ whenever the FIM is invertible:
Rˆθ ≥ FIM(θ)
−1, (2)
in the sense of non-negative definiteness of the difference matrix. In our framework, the parameter vector
can be the watermark signal or the secret key. (2) provides us a physical interpretation: the bigger the
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information leakage is, the more accurate the estimation of the secret parameter is.
The FIM is also an additive measure of the information, provided the observations are statistically
independent. Suppose that the watermark signal has been added in No pieces of content whose ex-
tracted vectors are independent and identically distributed as X ∼ N (0,RX). The observations are No
watermarked signals. Then, log pO(o;w) = −1/2
∑No
j=1(yj − w)R−1X (yj − w)T + const. Calculation
readily gives FIM(w) = NoR−1X . This models applications which detect presence of (and not decode)
watermarks, or also template signals which resynchronize content transformed by a geometric attack .
The mean square error E{‖θˆ − θ‖2} is the trace of Rˆθ , and thus its lower bound decreases in
No
−1
. However, the rate No? = Notr(FIM(θ)−1) depends on the statistical model and consequently the
kind of observations (see section IV). The estimation is significantly more accurate when the number
of independent observations increases of an order of No?. The bigger No?, the more difficult is the
disclosure of the secret key. This notion is close to the unicity distance of the above subsection. This is
the reason why we use the same notation No? (although absolutely not defined in the same way).
III. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF THE SUBSTITUTIVE METHOD
A. Mathematical model
In such a scheme, a binary vector x = (x(1) . . . x(Nv))T is extracted from the content. For instance,
in the famous Burgett, Koch, and Zao technique [18], Nv pairs of DCT coefficients of an image are
compared in absolute value. The message to be hidden is a binary vector m = (m(1) . . . m(Nc))T . The
secret key is a list of Nc integers k = [k(1), . . . , k(Nc)] with 1 ≤ k(`) ≤ Nv and k(`) 6= k(`′) if
` 6= `′. The embedding process copies x in y and then substitutes the k(`)-th bit of y by the `-th bit of
the message to be hidden: y(k(`)) = m(`). The inverse extraction function maps back the watermarked
vector y into the content. The decoding simply reads the bits whose indices are given by the secret key.
Example 1: Nv = 8 and Nc = 4:
DRAFT 1st of July, 2004. Revised 9th of November, 2004.
CAYRE et al.: WATERMARKING SECURITY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 11
m = (1101) k = [2, 8, 5, 3]
x = (01001011) y = (01100011)
The uncertainty of the opponent is given by the entropy of the secret key that the embedder has
randomly selected among Nv!/(Nv −Nc)! possible keys. Thus:
H(K) = log2
Nv!
(Nv −Nc)! (3)
B. Perfect covering
Theorem 1: As defined above, a substitutive watermarking scheme provides perfect covering.
Proof: We can model the substitutive watermarking as follows: let x be a binary Nv-length random
vector, whose probability mass function is uniform and equal to 2−Nv , and w be a binary Nv-length
vector whose bits equal to 1 indicates the bits to be flipped. Hence, we have y = x⊕w, giving:
pY(y) =
∑
w∈W
pY(y|w)pw(w) =
∑
w∈W
pX(y ⊕w)pw(w)
= 2−Nv
∑
w∈W
pw(w) = 2
−Nv ,
pY(y|w) = pX(y ⊕w) = 2−Nv .
The Bayes rule, pY(y|w)pW(w) = pW(w|y)pY(y), then gives pW(w) = pW(w|y).
C. Watermarked Only Attack
The substitutive method providing perfect covering, it is then very easy to show that I(Y;W) = 0,
which implies that I(Y;K) = 0. There is no information leakage, and the equivocation is equal to H(K)
whatever the number of observations. In a way, one can say that security level No? = +∞.
D. Known Message Attack
If the opponent observes only one watermarked content y1 and its hidden message m1, the indices
i such that y1(i) = m1(`) are possible values of k(`). Denote S1(`) this set. As P (y1(i) = m1(`)|i 6=
k(`)) = 1/2, there are in expectation 1 + (Nv − 1)/2 elements in this set.
1st of July, 2004. Revised 9th of November, 2004. DRAFT
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Fig. 4. Substitutive watermarking: equivocations for WOA, KMA and KOA, against the number of observations. Nc = 64,
Nv = 512. The triangle and the square respectively mark the security levels for the KMA and KOA.
Now assume that the opponent observes several contents yNo and their hidden messages mNo . Set
SNo(`) is now defined by SNo(`) = {i : yj(i) = mj(`) ∀j, 1 ≤ j ≤ No}. The probability that yj(i) =
mj(`)∀j knowing that i 6= k(`) is 1/2No . Thus, in expectation, |SNo | = 1 + (Nv − 1)/2No , and the
equivocation about k(`) is equal to log2(1+ 2−No(Nv − 1)). However, there might be some overlapping
between the Nc sets SNo(`), and the total equivocation is smaller than the sum of the equivocations about
k(`). As the calculus is quite complex, we stay with this approximation:
H(K|(Y,M)No) . Nc log2(1 + 2−No(Nv − 1)). (4)
Shannon approximated this equivocation by Nc(log2(Nv − 1) − No) when No  log2(Nv − 1), and
by 2−NoNc(Nv − 1)/ log(2) when No  log2(Nv − 1) (see Fig. 4). He also approximated the unicity
distance by No? = log2Nv [16, Sect. 14].
E. Known Original Attack
If the opponent observes only one watermarked content y1 and its original version x1, the indices i
such that x1(i) 6= y1(i) are possible values for the key samples. There are in expectation Nc/2 of such
DRAFT 1st of July, 2004. Revised 9th of November, 2004.
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indices, as p(x1(k(`)) = m1(`)) = 1/2. When the opponent observes j pairs, the set Sj = {` : ∃ j′, 1 ≤
j′ ≤ j, xj′(`) 6= yj′(`)} grows up. However, the event that an index revealed by a new pair was already
known happens with a probability |Sj−1|/Nc. This leads to the following series:
|Sj| = |Sj−1|+Nc(1− |Sj−1|/Nc)/2 = Nc(1− 2−j). (5)
Yet, it is not possible to assign a key sample to one of these indices. The equivocation is then the sum
of two terms: one is due to the Nc − |SNo | undisclosed indices to be picked up randomly among the
remaining candidates, the second one is due to the Nc! possible permutations of the chosen indices:
H(K|(Y,X)No) = log2
(
(Nv − d|SNo |e)!
(Nv −Nc)!(Nc − d|SNo |e)!
)
+ log2(Nc!). (6)
The security level (in the unicity distance sense) is not defined as the equivocation is always greater than
zero. This is due to the term log2(Nc!) reflecting the ambiguity in the order of the estimated key samples.
We preferably consider that within a number of observations greater than No? = log2Nc, the opponent
learns all the indices store in the secret key. This information is helpful for watermark jamming. He can
also notice if two hidden messages are the same. Yet, the ambiguity prevents him reading the hidden
messages (he cannot put the hidden bits in the right order), and writing hidden messages.
Fig. 4 gives a good synthesis of the results. In the WOA case, the opponent cannot get any information
on the key, and then cannot do anything. In the KMA case, he is able to completely disclose the key,
and then he will be able to read, erase, write or modify hidden messages. In the KOA case, he is able to
recover the components of the key but up to a permutation, and then he will be able to erase the hidden
message, but not to read or write a proper one.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS OF SPREAD SPECTRUM BASED TECHNIQUES
Spread spectrum is a military communication scheme invented during World War II [19]. It was
designed to be good at combatting interference due to jamming, hiding a signal by transmitting it at low
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power, and achieving secrecy. These properties make spread spectrum very popular in nowadays digital
watermarking. Theoretical studies [6] and practical implementations [20] focus on the optimization of
operational capacity-robustness functions at given embedding distortions.
A. Mathematical model
Denote by x a vector of Nv samples extracted from original content. The embedding is the addition
of the watermark signal which is the modulation of Nc private carriers u`:
w =
γ√
Nc
Nc∑
`=1
a(`)u`, (7)
where γ > 0 is a small gain fixing the embedding strength, and ‖u`‖ = 1, 1 ≤ ` ≤ Nc. The Watermark
to Content power Ratio (WCR) equals γ2σ2a/σ2x (or 10 log10(γ2σ2a/σ2x) if expressed in dB). The inverse
extraction puts back vector y = x+w into the media producing watermarked content.
Symbol vector a represents the message to be hidden/transmitted through content. In the case of a Direct
Sequence Spread Spectrum (DSSS), the modulation is a simple BPSK: a(`) = (−1)m(`), 1 ≤ ` ≤ Nc and
σ2a = 1. Yet, the scope of this model is far broader than the sole case of DSSS. Spread spectrum is a very
common process used to increase the signal to noise ratio by projecting signals on a smaller subspace of
dimension Nc < Nv. This also covers some side-informed watermarking techniques (sometimes called
spread transform) [5], [21]–[23]. Symbols a(`) are then continuous real values (see subsection V-D).
For security reason, the carriers are private and issued by a pseudo-random generator fed by a seed.
Many people think the secret key is the seed. This is not false as the disclosure of the seed obviously
gives the carriers and allows the watermarking channel access. However, the knowledge of the carriers
is sufficient and the pirate has no interest in getting back to the seed. Hence, in this article, the secret
key, defined as the object the opponent is keen on revealing, is the carriers.
In the sequel, the security analysis considers several watermarked vectors yj , 1 ≤ j ≤ No, with
different embedded messages aj = (aj(1) . . . aj(Nc))T being linearly mixed by the Nv × Nc matrix
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U = (u1 . . .uNc). To cancel inter-symbol interferences at the decoding side, carriers are two-by-two
orthogonal vectors: UTU = INc , where IN is the N×N identity matrix. Index i denotes the ith samples
of a signal, whereas j indices the different signals. Thus, there are No watermarked vectors given by:
yj = xj +
γ√
Nc
Uaj , (8)
or, equivalently, concatenating No vectors xj (resp. yj or aj) column-wise in the Nv × No matrix X
(resp. Y or the Nc ×No matrix A):
Y = X + γ√
Nc
UA . (9)
B. Perfect covering
Assume that X ∼ N (0,RX) and that w is picked up randomly among sequences distributed as
N (0,RW). Then, pY = N (0,RX + RW) and pY|W=w = N (w,RX). The Bayes rule shows that
spread spectrum based watermarking does not provide perfect covering. Even if the attacker has only
access to watermarked pieces of content, some information about the watermark signal is leaking from
these observations. The following subsections investigate whether the opponent can, thanks to this leakage
on the watermark signal, gain some knowledge about the secret carriers.
C. Known Message Attack
In this subsection, the opponent has access to (watermarked signals/hidden messages) pairs. Moreover,
only the DSSS technique (i.e., a BPSK modulation) is considered. Our attack may not work with side
information embedding because the opponent still ignores symbols a, as they also depend on the original
signal. Formally, the observations considered in this subsection are (y,a)No .
Assume, for simplicity reason, that each occurrence of random vector X is independently drawn from
N (0, σ2xINv). The following theoretical derivations (as well as the algorithm used in experiments in
section V) can be adapted to colored original signals and even non stationary original signals [24].
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Another motivation is that, according to the Power Spectrum Constraint [25], watermark signals usually
adopt the statistical structure of host signals in order to increase their robustness, i.e. RW = γ2RX.
Hence, the Karhunen-Loe`ve Transform simultaneously whitens both signals.
The likelihood is the probability of observing the data yNo , while knowing the model:
L(yNo) =
1
(
√
2piσx)NoNv
e
„
− 1
2σ2x
PNo
j=1 ‖yj− γ√
Nc
Uaj‖2
«
, (10)
and the log-likelihood is logL = K − 12σ2x
∑No
j=1 ‖yj − γ√NcUaj)‖
2. The opponent wants to estimate the
private carriers uNc . So, the derivative implied in the FIM is ψ = ∂ logL/∂(uT1 . . .uTNc)
T with
∂ logL
∂u`
=
γ
σ2x
√
Nc
No∑
j=1
aj(`)xj . (11)
Product expectation gives the following Nv ×Nv sub-blocks:
E
(
∂ logL
∂u`
)(
∂ logL
∂uk
)T
=
γ2
Ncσ2x
(Fuu)`,k
=
γ2
Ncσ2x
No∑
j=1
aj(`)aj(k)INv .
The FIM is then the following block matrix:
FIM =
γ2
Ncσ2x


(Fuu)1,1 . . . (Fuu)1,Nc
.
.
.
.
.
.
(Fuu)Nc,1 . . . (Fuu)Nc,Nc


=
γ2
Ncσ2x
Fuu No→+∞−→ No γ
2σ2a
Ncσ2x
INvNc . (12)
With a BPSK modulation, σa = 1. The information leakage is linear with the number of observations,
thanks to the assumption of independence, and the rate is given by the Watermark to Content power
Ratio per carrier γ2/Ncσ2x. The security level of spread spectrum based watermarking techniques against
KMA is No? = Ncσ2x/γ2 of (watermarked signals/hidden messages) pairs.
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D. Known Original Attack
The opponent observes (y,x)No . The vector difference of each observation j gives the source signals
aj being linearly mixed by the Nv ×Nc matrix U :
dj = yj − xj = γ√
Nc
Uaj. (13)
Assume that No ≥ Nc and that there are at least Nc linearly independent messages. The difference
matrix D = Y − X ∝ UA is then full rank, and Span (D) = Span (U). The observation of difference
vectors discloses the secret subspace Span (U), provided symbol matrix A is full rank. However, this
doesn’t reveal the private carriers. Denote by E a matrix whose columns constitute an orthonormal basis
of the subspace Span (D). We have E = UPT , with P a unitary Nc × Nc matrix. A priori, there is no
reason for which P = INc . Hence, decoding the symbols with matrix E gives the following mixture
v =
√
NcETd/γ = Pa. This is a blind source separation (BSS) problem with a square mixing matrix.
Comon proved that it is possible to identify P (and thus U), but up to a permutation and scale ambiguity,
only if at most one source is Gaussian [26]. The scale ambiguity is indeed a sign ambiguity in our
problem, as we set UTU = I . In conclusion, at best, the mixing matrix is identified by Uˆ = ΠΣU with
Π a permutation matrix and Σ a diagonal matrix whose elements are ±1. At best for the opponent, the
secret carriers are identified up to a signed permutation (i.e., matrix ΠΣ) ambiguity.
The likelihood to observe v for a given matrix P is p(v;P) = |detP|−1pA(P−1v), and its score is:
∂
∂P log p(v;P) = −P
−T + P−Tχ(P−1v)vTP−T , (14)
with χ(x) = − ∂
∂x
log pA(x) [27]. The asymptotic accuracy of the estimations is known to be only
dependent on the symbols distribution, and especially on its non-Gaussianity. As, in our case, symbols
are i.i.d., denote by χ(.) the score function of aj(i), and by χn(.) the score function of a Gaussian
random variable sharing the same variance (i.e., χn(x) = x/σ2a). The trace of the Crame´r-Rao Bound is
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then shown to be proportional to (g−1 + 1/2)/2No for large No [28], with g defined as:
g =
E{(χ(a) − χn(a))2}
E{χn(a)2} . (15)
However, g is not above bounded and tends to +∞ when the symbols tend to have a discrete or bounded
support. This is typically the case in watermarking, as the embedder would not allow the use of unbounded
symbols for a perceptual distortion reason. In the case of discrete symbols, error free mixing matrix
recovery is possible within a finite number of observations. For instance, [29] shows a workable algorithm
needing No > Nc2 observations for BPSK symbols. In the case of bounded support symbols, the trace
of CRB decreases at a faster rate than 1/No [28], [30].
E. Watermarked Only Attack
In this section, the sources are unknown and can then be regarded as nuisance parameters [31], [32].
Vector ψ equals then ∂ logL/∂(uT1 . . .uTNca
T
1 . . . a
T
No
)T , with the following Nc × 1 vectors:
∂ logL
∂aj
=
γ
σ2x
√
Nc
UTxj ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , No}. (16)
Product expectation gives the following sub-blocks:
E
(
∂ logL
∂aj
∂ logL
∂ak
T)
=
γ2
Ncσ2x
(Faa)j,k = γ
2
Ncσ2x
INcδj,k
E
(
∂ logL
∂u`
∂ logL
∂aj
T)
=
γ2
Ncσ2x
(Fua)`,j = γ
2
Ncσ2x
(Fau)Tj,`,
where δi,j is the Kronecker function. We write with explicit notation:
FIM =
γ2
Ncσ2x

 Fuu Fua
Fau Faa

 . (17)
Note that Faa = INoNc . The Crame´r-Rao Bound for estimated Vect(U) = (uT1 , . . . ,uTNc)T is given by:
CRB(Vect(U)) = Ncσ
2
x
γ2
F˜−1uu , (18)
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with F˜uu = (Fuu−FuaF−1aa Fau) = (Fuu−FuaFau). It is known that, in the general case, F˜−1uu ≥ F−1uu
(i.e. F˜−1uu −F−1uu is non negative definite). In other words, nuisance parameters render the estimation of
U less accurate [27]. But, the situation is even worse here as the FIM becomes singular. Indeed:
(FuaFau)`,k =
No∑
j=1
(Fua)`,j(Fau)j,k =
No∑
j=1
aj(`)aj(k)UUT , (19)
therefore F˜uu = AAT ⊗ (INv − UUT ). As (INv − UUT )uk = 0, F˜uu is singular.
This problem stems from two facts. First, we did not integrate some constraints during our derivation.
Especially, we know that uT` uk = δ`,k. [31] gives an alternative expression for the bound in the case
where the unconstrained problem is unidentifiable and the FIM non invertible.
However, the integration of the above-mentioned constraints in the derivation of the FIM is not sufficient
for Nc > 1. The second fact is that an ambiguity remains about the order and ‘phase’ of the carriers.
The system is only identifiable up to a signed permutation. The case Nc = 1 is interesting, as constraint
integration removes the FIM singularity because the ambiguity of the permutation does not exist.
1) One carrier: The parameter vector to be estimated is composed of the unique carrier and the hidden
symbols as nuisance parameters: (UTA). Please, note that UT and A are row vectors in this case. The
constraint on u1 is: (‖u1‖2−1)/2 = 0. The sequel is only the strict application of [31]. The 1×(Nv+No)
gradient matrix of the constraint is equal to G = (uT1 0TNo), where 0N is a N zero vector. There exists a
matrix H ∈ R(Nv+No)×(Nv+No−1) whose columns form a basis for the nullspace of G, that is, such that
GH = 0. In our case, one particular choice of H is readily verified to be:
H =

 U
⊥ 0
0 INo

 , (20)
with U⊥ a basis of the complementary subspace of Span(u1) in RNv . Then, according to [31, Th. 1], the
Crame´r-Rao Bound under the above-mentioned constraint is CRB(UTA) = H(HT FIM H)−1HT . With
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our choice of H, this yields:
CRB(UTA) = σ
2
x
γ2

 (AA
T )−1U⊥U⊥T 0
0 INo

 , (21)
and we finally get:
CRB(UT ) = σ
2
x
γ2
(AAT )−1U⊥U⊥T No→+∞−→ σ
2
x
Noσ2aγ
2
U⊥U⊥T . (22)
2) Nc carriers (Nc > 1): The ambiguity renders the FIM singular, even when considering the
constraints. However, section V shows that, in practice, the opponent builds noisy estimation of the
carriers up to a signed permutation. A possibility in [32], is to pretend that the opponent knows Nm
messages (for instance {a`}Nm`=1), in order to artificially remove the ambiguity. This adds NmNc constraints
of the type: aˆj(`) = aj(`). At the end, calculation leads to:
CRB(Vect(U)) = Ncσ
2
x
γ2
HuuB−1HuuT , (23)
with B the Nc(Nv −Nm)×Nc(Nv −Nm) matrix whose (Nv −Nm)× (Nv −Nm) blocks are (B)`,k =
(AAT )`,kU⊥T` U⊥k −(ANm:NoANm:NoT )`,kU⊥Tl UUTU⊥k , and Huu the NcNv×Nc(Nv−1) diagonal matrix
whose Nv × (Nv − 1) blocks on diagonal are (Huu)`,` = U⊥` . In these expressions, the columns of U⊥`
form an orthonormal basis of the complementary subspace of Span (u`), and ANm:No = (aNm+1 . . . aNo).
However, the minimal number Nm to remove the ambiguity depends on the symbols’ pdf [32].
Facing the difficulty of finding the right parameter Nm and the cumbersome calculus, we prefer to
approximate the information leakage about a carrier by (22), where γ2 is replaced by the power per
carrier γ2/Nc. The security level is then No? = Ncσ2x/σ2aγ2 which is, by the way, coherent with (23).
This is quite surprising because the security level is the same against KMA. Yet, the estimation of the
secret carriers remains up to a signed permutation in the WOA.
F. Possible Hacks
The conclusion of this security analysis stands in the different possibilities to forge pirated content.
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• The pirate discloses secret subspace Span (U). He can now focus attack’s noise in this subspace to
jam the communication far more efficiently. He can also nullify the watermarked signals projection
in this subspace to remove the watermark.
• The pirate discloses the secret carriers up to a signed permutation. The above-mentioned hacks are
still possible. Besides, he can detect whether two watermarked pieces of content share the same
hidden message. He can also flip some randomly chosen bits. Moreover, the accidental knowledge
of hidden messages in few watermarked pieces of content might remove this ambiguity. This extra
security analysis indeed pertains to subsection III-D.
• The pirate discloses the secret carriers. He has a full access to the watermarking channel to read,
write or erase hidden message.
Of course, the quality of the pirated pieces of content depends on the accuracy of his estimation. The
authors focus on this aspect in [33].
V. ALGORITHMS FOR SPREAD SPECTRUM BASED TECHNIQUES
Section III not only gives security levels of the substitutive method, but also contains almost practical
implementations of workable algorithms. On the contrary, section IV only presents theoretical assessment
of security levels. Hence, this section deals with practical algorithms useful to hack spread spectrum
based watermarking schemes. For each attack, an algorithm is presented, and tested on synthetic data as
supposed by the model of (8), with BPSK symbols and gaussian host vectors. These algorithms are then
applied on spread transform side information methods and one still image technique.
This section has an intensive use of PCA and ICA algorithms, which is completely new in watermarking
security analysis, as the only other papers mentioning PCA/ICA in the watermarking community have
different purposes. [34] and [35] used ICA to design a watermarking embedder. [36] presented a technique
for estimating the watermark by observing only one image. Their purpose is the simple erasure of the
1st of July, 2004. Revised 9th of November, 2004. DRAFT
22 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON SIGNAL PROCESSING, VOL.XX, NO.Y, XYZ 2005
whole watermark signal and not the disclosure of the secret parameters, whereas the approach here allows
a complete access to the watermarking communication channel to remove, read or write hidden data 2.
The following average normalized correlation measures the efficiency of our attack:
η =
1
Nc
Nc∑
`=1
uˆT` u`
‖uˆ`‖ . (24)
Although the normalization renders estimators uˆj/‖uˆj‖ biased [38], the normalized correlation is pre-
ferred because it is an extremely popular measure in the watermarking community. η . 1 means that the
opponent discloses vectors almost collinear with the secret carriers. When existing, we manually removed
the ambiguity of the signed permutation. Measures of η are done averaging Nt = 128 experimental results.
The relation with the theoretical security levels is not difficult to find out. (24) is in expectation the
cosine of the angle between u` and uˆ` = u` + n, n being the estimation noise (orthogonal to u` and
whose norm is
√
tr(CRB(Vect(U)))/Nc, with tr(A) the trace of matrix A.) The following relation holds:
η ≈ ‖u`‖√‖u`‖2 + tr(CRB(Vect(U)))/Nc . (25)
A. Known Message Attack
Observing (y,a)No , the opponent can use the Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) related to (10).
This estimator is also defined by ∂ logL
∂u`
= 0 ∀` ∈ {1, . . . , Nc}, which gives:
Uˆ =
√
Nc
γ
(YAT )(AAT )−1. (26)
The MLE is known to be unbiased and consistent, i.e. it asymptotically achieves the CRB derived in
subsection IV-D. Fig. (5) shows experimental values of η against No and WCR = γ2/σ2x for the DSSS
case. The locus of points such that η = const are projected on the plane η = 0. They appear to be
parallel with the curve No = Ncσ2x/γ2. Tests done with different Nv confirm that the efficiency of the
2We discovered after submission a similar approach uniquely devoted to watermark removal and only based on PCA in [37].
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Fig. 5. KMA for DSSS (Nc = 4, Nv = 512). η against log10(No) and WCR in dB. The curve No = Ncσ2x/γ2 is plotted
with small circles.
attack does not depend on the vector length. This asserts the theoretical security level of subsection IV-C.
B. Known Original Attack
In this case, the opponent observes several instances of dj = (yj−xj) ∝ Uaj . As seen in subsection IV-
D, this is related to the well known problem of signal processing called Blind Source Separation (BSS),
with no noise. A lot of papers have already been written on BSS, and we just recall here its most common
algorithms. Note that spread spectrum corresponds to the BSS over-determined case (i.e., Nv ≥ Nc).
The most classical algorithm in BSS is the Principal Component Analysis (PCA). Denote D = Y−X .
This technique makes an eigendecomposition of the matrix DDT = γ2UAATUT /Nc. This corresponds
to a Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization of vectors dNo . Please, note that ρ ∆= Rank (A) is also the rank
of DDT . Hence, the decomposition outputs ρ orthonormal vectors lying in Span (U). In the best case,
the opponent has ρ = min(No, Nc). Nevertheless, in reality, he may have ρ ≤ min(No, Nc) if the No
symbol vectors are linearly dependent.
When successful (i.e., when ρ = Nc), the PCA technique yields a orthonormal basis of the secret
subspace Span (U). The possibilities to hack watermarked pieces of content when Span (U) is disclosed
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Fig. 6. PCA vs. ICA. PCA finds the secret carriers up to a rotation, whereas ICA succeeds to align the estimated carriers uˆNc
with uNc (Here, Nc = 2). An ambiguity remains in their order (permutation) and orientation (sign).
are summarized in subsection IV-F. Yet, the vectors of this basis are not necessary collinear with the
private carriers. This is due to the unitary matrix P mentioned in subsection IV-D. The opponent cannot
decode, as projection of watermarked signals onto this basis gives a mixture of the hidden symbols. This
is illustrated by Fig. 6. The same reason prevents him transmitting information in the hidden channel.
Nevertheless, under the assumption that the symbol vectors are statistically independent, the opponent
can resort to a more powerful tool: the Independent Component Analysis (ICA). It is an extension of
PCA, constraining the output estimated symbol vectors to be independent [26]. Good tutorials on ICA
and on its links with BSS are [28], [39]. A very general ICA algorithm named FastICA [40] has been
preferred to algorithms dedicated to specific symbol distribution [29], [30].
In short, ICA algorithms usually work in the basis recovered by a PCA. This basis describes exactly
the secret subspace (provided that ρ = Nc). The problem is now reduced to the estimation of the Nc×Nc
matrix P. Hence, parameter Nv has absolutely no influence on the attack. Then, in an iterative process,
the ICA ‘rotates’ the basis until it nullifies an objective function (often called a constrast function) of the
estimated sources aˆNo . This function can be an approximation of the mutual information of the estimated
sources. Contrast functions depend on the distribution of the symbol sources. However, this measure
reflects statistical independence only for large No. For a finite number of observations, ICA algorithms
usually search for a minimum of the contrast function with the help of a gradient descent technique.
When successful, ICA reduces the set of ambiguity matrices P to the one of signed permutations.
This is illustrated by Fig. 6. Subsection IV-F lists the possibilities to hack watermarked pieces of content
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when the carriers are disclosed up to a signed permutation.
C. Watermarked Only Attack
The WOA case is quite similar to KOA, as it is related to BSS in a noisy environment. The covariance
matrix Ry has the following expression:
Ry = Rx + γ
2
Nc
URaUT = σ2xI +
γ2σ2a
Nc
UUT . (27)
Its diagonalization leads to Nc eigenvalues equaling σ2x +
γ2σ2a
Nc
, and Nv −Nc eigenvalues equaling σ2x.
Hence, the eigenvectors related to the Nc biggest values constitute a basis of Span (U), which is also
known as the signal space in blind equalization for digital communications.
PCA estimates covariance matrix Ry by YYT /No, and outputs Nc eigenvectors whose eigenvalues are
the biggest ones. Due to this rough estimation, these vectors do not live exactly in Span (U). Compared to
Fig. 6, these noisy estimation vectors would not lie in the plan of the page, regarded as subspace Span (U)
in this simple example. However, ICA will still try to rotate them in order to render the decoded symbols
independent. Fig. 7 shows the locus of points such that η = const for different values of Nc and No,
with the DSSS method (i.e., a BPSK modulation). The ICA algorithm meets the theoretical limit only
for large No, and high energy of watermark signal per carrier: γ2Nv/Nc. Note that, for Nc = 4, the gap
between experimental performances and theoretical limit gets larger.
D. Spread transform side information watermarking
This subsection presents experiments with side information watermarking using the process on spread
spectrum. In these methods, the symbols aj(`) depend on the host signal in the following way:
aj(`) = f(mj(`),u
T
` xj) (28)
Three techniques were investigated: Improved Spread Spectrum (ISS) [23], Scalar Costa Scheme (SCS)
[21], and Maximized Robustness Embedding (MRE) [22]. Two implementations of SCS have been done.
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Fig. 7. WOA for DSSS. Operating points achieving η = 0.8 for different parameters Nc and Nv . The solid line is the theoretical
limit for Nc = 1, and curves with stars, circles and triangles are the experimental results. They capture the efficiency of the
PCA, as only one carrier is used. The dashed line is the theoretical limit for Nc = 4 (i.e. the solid line translated of log10(Nc)),
the dashed curve with circles is the experimental results with the FastICA algorithm [40].
The carriers have disjoint supports in the first one, which is a possible interpretation of [21]: u1 =
(uT0Tτ . . . 0
T
τ )
T
, u2 = (0
T
τ u
T . . . 0Tτ )
T
, and so on with τNc = Nv. The second implementation is called
SCS with Subspace Projection (SSP) [41]: the carriers have a full support and are orthonormal. The
embedding distortion, the vector length and the number of hidden bits are the same for a fair comparison.
The KMA case has not been investigated. The knowledge of the messages does not usually imply the
disclosure of the symbols. In SCS, function f(.) of (28) is private and depends on a secret key (i.e.,
a dithering vector). However, information about the symbols may leak from the message. Symbols are
Gaussian variables centered on γ(−1)mj(`) for the ISS technique:
aj(`) = γ(−1)mj(`) − λuT` xj . (29)
We foresee that the MLE algorithm could easily be tuned to exploit this information leakage.
The KOA is simpler, as the basic assumption is still valid: uT` xj and uTk xj (k 6= `) are Gaussian
distributed and non correlated; thus, the symbols are statistically independent. Yet, the efficiency of
BSS depends on the symbols distribution, so that we expect different performances. Once again, in our
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Fig. 8. KOA for four different watermarking techniques(Nc = 4, Nv = 512). Dotted line: η = (1 + k/No)−1; Dash-dotted
line: η = (1 + (k/No)2)−1.
simulation, the opponent always uses the same generic ICA algorithm. No fine tuning according to the
expected symbols distribution is done. Fig. (8) shows the results, except for SCS3. Surprisingly, the rate
of the noise estimation variance is in 1/No2 for DSSS, SSP and MRE. This seems to be due to the
bounded support feature of the symbols in these methods, despite of the use of a generic algorithm. For
ISS, the rate is in 1/No. Please, note that, according to (29), the KOA for ISS is similar to a WOA for
the SS method, with a watermark to host power ratio of γ2/λ2σ2x. A smarter attack on ISS stems from
this remark. First, difference vectors are used to disclose the secret subspace with a PCA. Then, they are
corrected in adding the projection of the original vectors scaled by a factor λ. We are now in a situation
similar to a KOA with DSSS. Finally, ICA finishes the job working on the corrected vectors. The last
curve named ‘Corrected ISS’ in Fig. (8) shows the dramatic improvement. The security level of ISS is
in practice as low as the DSSS one.
The WOA is also straightforward as we applied the same ICA algorithm for DSSS, ISS, MRE, and
SSP. For SCS, the observed watermarked vectors are split by chunks of τ samples. Thus, the opponent
3For SCS, No = 1 is enough to disclose small length carrier u up to a sign.
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has No′ = Noτ vectors whose length is Nv ′ = Nv/τ , watermarked with Nc′ = 1 secret carrier. The
algorithm is thus a simple PCA in this case. Fig. (9) shows the results. SCS (or more precisely the way we
have implemented it) is obviously the less secure. But the simple change brought in the implementation
of SSP is sufficient to correct this security flaw 4. The other techniques share the same security level.
ISS seems to be slightly more secure; however, remember that we did not tune the contrast function of
the ICA algorithm. In the same way, the embedding parameters (γ, λ) play a big role in the symbols
distribution, and the attack might thus perform differently. This is the reason why we prefer to look at
the global shape of the curves, rather than to draw erroneous conclusions from these meager differences.
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Fig. 9. WOA for five different watermarking methods (Nv = 512, Nc = 4, WCR=-15dB). τ = 128 for SCS. For SCS, SSP
and ISS, the embedding parameters are optimal for an expected noise attack whose distortion equals the embedding distortion:
WNR=0 dB.
4We only analyze here the security of the spreading transform. Yet, the dithering vector in SCS-like technique constitute a
second barrier, which will be the subject of a future work.
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E. Application to a robust watermarking technique
The goal of this last subsection is to demonstrate the power of ‘smart’ attacks based on secret carriers
estimation. So far, this article has investigated the first phase of the attack: the secret disclosure. Now, in
a second phase, the opponent uses this a posteriori information to hack pieces of content, which were
watermarked with the same secret key. To this end, the subsection deals with real still images. The robust
watermarking technique from [20] has been chosen.
A challenge is proposed to two opponents: they attack a watermarked image with an increasing attack
distortion, until an oracle warns them that the decoded message is different from the embedded message
(Nc = 8 bits, PSNR=38dB). Pirate A uses blind attacks (i.e., pertaining to the robustness issue – except
any geometric attack). For instance, in this article, he scales the size of the image by a quarter, JPEG
compresses it with a decreasing quality factor, and finally scales back the image. Pirate B uses smart
attacks. He has estimated the secret carriers by a WOA, with No ∼ 1000 images such that η = 0.55, and
he tries to remove the hidden information for one carrier. Details of algorithm adaptations to real images
may be found in [33]. Fig. (10) shows the result of the challenge for the Lena image. For a panel of 50
pictures (512 × 512 pixels), pirate B on average produces an attack distortion 15dB smaller than pirate
A to successfully hack watermarked pictures.
VI. CONCLUSION
As in cryptanalysis, measurement of information leakages is the fundamental principle underlying the
theoretical framework for robust watermarking security assessment presented in this article. A watermark-
ing technique, even robust, is not secure if the opponent can refine his knowledge on the presumably
secret key while pieces of content are watermarked with the same key. The security level is then defined
5The opponent cannot know this last value. However, nothing prevents him to run simulations with his own private carriers
in order to estimate η.
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(a) Pirate A (b) Pirate B
Fig. 10. Comparison between the two pirated Lena images. This is their best quality for a successful attack. Pirate A: PSNR=21.8
dB, Pirate B: PSNR=35.8 dB.
by the number of observations the opponent needs in order to accurately estimate the secret key.
The conclusion of this article is not that spread spectrum based watermarking techniques or substitutive
schemes are broken. The goal is to warn the watermarking community that security is a crucial issue.
Designers should not only control the imperceptibility and the robustness of their schemes but also
assess their security levels. Depending on the application designers are targeting (and especially on the
observations available to the pirate), watermarking several pieces of content with the same key might
bring threats. This potentially arises difficulties on the key management. For instance, it is not clear
how a blind watermarking decoder will be informed of the secret key, if this later one is to be changed
according to the security levels assessed in this article.
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